Rapid Support Forces

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a Sudanese paramilitary organization with roots in the Janjaweed militias mobilized by the government of Omar al-Bashir during the Darfur conflict. Sudan formally reorganized and reactivated these forces as the RSF in 2013, initially assigning them counterinsurgency duties in Darfur and later in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, has led the organization since its creation, while his brother Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo has served as a senior deputy and overseen business interests associated with the Dagalo family. The RSF was integrated into Sudan's formal security architecture but retained substantial autonomy from the regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Its rapid expansion was supported by tribal recruitment networks, access to gold-producing areas, state patronage, cross-border mobility and foreign relationships. The force also participated in border and migration-control operations, including efforts to intercept Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants under arrangements connected to the Khartoum Process. It deployed contingents outside Sudan, including to Yemen and Libya, where Sudanese fighters served alongside regional armed actors. Following the overthrow of al-Bashir in 2019, the RSF remained a major power broker during Sudan's unstable transition. Its forces were implicated in the violent dispersal of the sit-in in Khartoum in June 2019, an event widely associated with killings, sexual violence, unlawful detention and looting. The RSF subsequently shared power with the SAF in a transitional governing arrangement, but tensions between the two organizations intensified over the timetable and terms for integrating the RSF into the national army. In October 2021, the RSF and SAF participated in a coup that ended the transitional civilian-led government. Open conflict between the two forces began in April 2023 after negotiations over security-sector reform and military integration collapsed. The war spread across Khartoum, Darfur, Gezira and other areas, producing mass displacement, severe destruction of civilian infrastructure and a major humanitarian crisis. The RSF captured or contested substantial territory, while the SAF retained control of important military installations and parts of northern and eastern Sudan. Human Rights Watch, the International Criminal Court, Genocide Watch and the United States government have accused RSF personnel and allied forces of grave international crimes. Allegations include mass killings, ethnic persecution, forced displacement, rape and other sexual violence, recruitment and use of children, torture, pillage, destruction of homes and public institutions, and the deliberate obstruction or use of starvation. The most serious accusations concern attacks on non-Arab communities in Darfur, although RSF operations have also harmed Arab civilians and other groups perceived to support the SAF. The organization's finances have been associated with control of gold mines and trading networks. Investigations have described links between RSF structures and companies connected to the Dagalo family, including Al Junaid, GSK and Tradive General Trading. The United Arab Emirates has repeatedly been accused of providing covert assistance through regional supply routes, allegations it has denied. Chad and Libya have also been linked in reporting to RSF recruitment, logistics or supply networks, although the extent of official state involvement remains contested. The RSF publicly presents itself as an anti-Islamist force and, in 2025, announced plans with allied movements for a secular and democratic parallel administration called the Government of Peace and Unity. International and Sudanese observers have generally treated this claim with skepticism, arguing that the initiative could consolidate territorial partition and provide political cover for military rule. The RSF remains an armed actor rather than a conventional commercial brand; its inclusion in a brand-style encyclopedia reflects its public identity, organizational symbols and institutional positioning, not a consumer-market function.

The RSF emerged from the Janjaweed militia structures used by the Sudanese government during the War in Darfur. Those militias were accused of attacking rebel movements and civilian communities, particularly non-Arab populations, through village destruction, killings, forced displacement and sexual violence. Rather than dissolving the networks after the height of the Darfur conflict, the government reorganized them into a more formal paramilitary institution. The RSF was established in 2013 under the leadership of Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. Its early missions included counterinsurgency in Darfur and operations against rebel groups in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Although nominally part of Sudan's security system, it developed an independent command structure and recruitment base. Its fighters were drawn heavily from Arab tribal networks in Darfur, Chad and the wider Sahelian Baggara belt. Estimates of its strength varied substantially over time, reflecting rapid recruitment, cross-border mobility and the absence of transparent personnel records. Hemedti's rise was linked to the force's military utility and its control of economically valuable territory. In 2017, the RSF took control of gold-mining areas in Darfur. Investigations later reported close financial relationships between RSF-linked actors and companies associated with Hemedti's family, particularly Al Junaid. Gold extraction and trading, state patronage, foreign support and overseas military deployments helped the organization acquire resources outside ordinary army or budgetary controls. RSF units were also used in migration-control operations along Sudan's borders and sent to conflicts in Yemen and Libya. The 2019 Sudanese revolution ended Omar al-Bashir's long rule but did not remove the RSF from political life. Hemedti became one of the most influential figures in the transitional order, sharing authority with SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The RSF's reputation deteriorated further after the June 2019 Khartoum massacre, when security forces, including RSF personnel according to extensive reporting and investigations, attacked protesters. The episode generated accusations of murder, rape, unlawful detention and looting. In October 2021, Hemedti and al-Burhan participated in a coup that displaced the transitional civilian government. The two military organizations subsequently disagreed over the distribution of power and the proposed integration of the RSF into the regular armed forces. Those disputes culminated in fighting on 15 April 2023. The war rapidly spread from Khartoum to Darfur, Gezira and other regions. RSF forces captured significant urban areas and supply routes, while the SAF maintained major bases and controlled much of the north and east. The war transformed the RSF from a powerful domestic auxiliary into one of the principal parties to a national civil war. Its conduct has been the subject of extensive documentation by human-rights organizations, United Nations investigators, journalists and international legal bodies. Allegations include ethnic massacres, forced displacement, rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage, child recruitment, torture, looting, attacks on hospitals and deliberate starvation. The greatest concentration of accusations concerns Darfur, where the RSF and allied Arab militias have attacked non-Arab communities, but violence has also affected civilians in Khartoum, Gezira and other areas. The RSF's external relationships have remained opaque. The UAE has been repeatedly accused of supplying or financing the organization, often through networks involving Chad and regional air routes; the UAE has denied supporting the RSF. The force has also been linked to recruitment in Chad and other neighboring states, logistics through Libya and business entities in the United Arab Emirates. These relationships have made the conflict part of a wider regional competition over gold, borders, trade routes and political influence. In 2025, the RSF announced a political project with allied movements to establish a secular and democratic parallel government with a bill of rights. Critics argued that the declaration was intended to gain legitimacy and consolidate territorial control rather than demonstrate a credible transition to civilian rule. The United Nations and other observers warned that competing administrations could make peace negotiations more difficult and deepen the division of Sudan. The RSF therefore remains both an armed organization and a de facto political authority in areas under its control, with its future dependent on the outcome of the war, international pressure and negotiations over Sudan's state structure.

• 2025

  Parallel-government declaration

  [1]Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org

  The RSF and allied groups announced the proposed Government of Peace and Unity.

• 2023

  Beginning of the Sudanese civil war

  [1]Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org

  Open warfare began between the RSF and SAF after negotiations over integration and political authority failed.

• 2023

  Official logo revision

  [1]Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org

  The RSF removed the word Quds from its official emblem used in published statements.

• 2021

  Participation in the October coup

  [1]Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org

  The RSF and SAF removed Sudan's transitional civilian government and assumed direct political control.

• 2019

  Khartoum sit-in crackdown

  [1]Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org

  RSF personnel were accused of severe abuses during the dispersal of pro-democracy protesters in Khartoum.

• 2017

  Expansion into gold-producing areas

  [1]Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org

  RSF forces took control of gold-mining areas in Darfur, strengthening the organization's independent financial base.

• 2013

  Formal establishment of the RSF

  [1]Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org

  The Sudanese government reorganized Janjaweed-related militias into the Rapid Support Forces under Hemedti's command.

A state-origin paramilitary and political-military organization that publicly frames itself as a mobile national security and anti-Islamist force, while critics and investigators characterize it as an autonomous militia network sustained by ethnic mobilization, resource extraction and foreign patronage.

• Paramilitary organization · 2013

  Rapid Support Forces

  The RSF is a mobile paramilitary force organized for counterinsurgency, territorial control, border operations and political coercion. It operates through regional commands and locally recruited units rather than through consumer products or commercial service lines. Its activities have included combat operations in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Khartoum and Gezira, as well as deployments outside Sudan.

• Proposed parallel political administration · 2025

  Government of Peace and Unity

  Announced in 2025 with allied movements, this proposed administration was presented as secular and democratic and was said to include a bill of rights. Observers questioned whether it represented a genuine civilian transition or an effort to institutionalize RSF territorial control.

• 2024

  Genocide and crimes-against-humanity accusations in Darfur

  The RSF and allied forces were accused by international and governmental bodies of genocidal attacks and other grave crimes against non-Arab communities in Darfur.

  Source

• 2023

  War-crimes allegations during the civil war

  Human-rights investigators documented allegations against RSF personnel involving mass killings, ethnic persecution, rape, forced displacement, child recruitment, pillage and attacks on civilian infrastructure.

  Source

• 2019

  Khartoum massacre allegations

  RSF forces were accused of killing protesters, committing sexual violence, conducting unlawful detentions and looting during the June dispersal of the Khartoum sit-in.

  Source

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• 2023War against the Sudanese Armed Forces

  Sudan

  The RSF launched and fought a nationwide conflict against the SAF after the breakdown of negotiations over the future of Sudan's security sector.

  Outcome. The conflict caused mass displacement, widespread destruction and allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

  Source
• 2017Border and migration-control operations

  Sudan · Libya

  The RSF patrolled borders and intercepted Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants in operations associated with European-African migration-control cooperation.

  Outcome. The role increased the RSF's international security profile while attracting criticism concerning accountability and the treatment of migrants.

  Source
• 2016Yemen deployment

  Yemen

  RSF personnel were deployed as part of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen.

  Outcome. The deployment demonstrated the organization's use as an expeditionary force and contributed to its recruitment and financing networks.

  Source
• 2013Counterinsurgency operations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile

  Sudan

  The newly formalized RSF was deployed against rebel movements and communities associated with insurgency in western and southern Sudan.

  Outcome. The operations expanded the RSF's territorial role but generated extensive allegations of abuses against civilians.

  Source

• 2025

  Announce a parallel governmentStrategy

  Background

  The RSF sought political legitimacy while holding territory during the civil war.

  Action taken

  It announced the proposed Government of Peace and Unity with allied movements and described it as secular and democratic.

  Aftermath

  The initiative drew skepticism and warnings that it could deepen Sudan's institutional fragmentation and complicate peace efforts.

  Source

• 2023

  Resist integration into the regular armed forcesStrategy

  Background

  Negotiations required the RSF to be integrated into the SAF, but the parties disagreed over timing, command and political authority.

  Action taken

  The dispute escalated into open warfare between the RSF and SAF.

  Aftermath

  Sudan entered a nationwide civil war and the RSF became a de facto territorial and political authority in areas it controlled.

  Source

• 2021

  Join the military takeover of SudanOther

  Background

  The transitional civilian government faced mounting conflict with the security establishment.

  Action taken

  The RSF joined the SAF in removing the civilian-led transitional government.

  Aftermath

  The coup ended the transitional political arrangement and intensified competition between the two armed forces.

  Source

• 2017

  Build an independent resource base through gold-sector controlStrategy

  Background

  The RSF required funding and logistics beyond ordinary government security structures.

  Action taken

  RSF forces took control of gold-producing areas in Darfur, while companies linked to the Dagalo family became involved in mining and trading.

  Aftermath

  Investigations later alleged that gold revenues helped finance RSF operations and strengthened the Dagalo family's political power.

  Source

• 2013

  Formalize Janjaweed-related militias as a national paramilitary forceStrategy

  Background

  The Sudanese government sought a more structured auxiliary force for counterinsurgency operations.

  Action taken

  It established the RSF under Hemedti and deployed it in several conflict regions.

  Aftermath

  The organization gained autonomy, expanded its recruitment base and became a central actor in Sudanese politics.

  Source

1. 1Rapid Support Forcesen.wikipedia.org
2. 2Rapid Support Forces official websitersf.gov.sd